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RECENT DECISIONS 
FEDERAL CouRTS-CHoICE OF LAw-R.EFusAL To APPLY STATE LIMITA-
TION To FEDERALLY-CREATED RIGHT-Plaintiffs, two corporations and a joint 
venture, brought suit in a federal district court in California for damages 
arising from alleged unfair labor practices by defendant unions. Juris• 
diction was based primarily on section 303(b) of the Labor-Management 
Relations Act1 which creates a private right of action in persons injured 
by unlawful secondary boycott activities.2 Defendants moved to dismiss,3 
contending that the action was barred by the applicable statute of limita• 
tions, which, in the absence of any federal limitation specifically pertain-
ing to actions under section 303, was the appropriate California statute.4 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintained that the pervasiveness of Con-
gress' coverage of the labor field indicated an intent to make diverse state 
statutes inapplicable, arguing that either an analogous federal statuter; 
must be used or the federal courts should apply no period of limitations 
until Congress has acted. Ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss, held, 
motion denied. A state statute of limitations will not be applied to a 
federally-created cause of action if the effect is to defeat the legislative pur-
pose. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engrs, 
198 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 1961). 
During the past century Congress has created a substantial number of 
statutory rights of action which do not specify periods of limitations.6 
This remedial detail has been left to judicial determination and the result 
is a well-settled, albeit cumbersome, legal hybrid. Since 1895,7 the Supreme 
Court has adhered to the view that in actions at law, or where the remedy 
may be either legal or equitable,8 the federal courts are compelled by the 
l 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1958). 
2 LMRA § 303(a), 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (1958). 
3 The issue of limitations is normally an affirmative defense to be raised in the 
answer. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). However, where the passage of time is apparent from the 
face of the complaint, the defense may be raised by motion to dismiss. E.g., Anderson v. 
Linton, 178 F.2d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 1949); Wilson v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 147 F. Supp. 
513, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1957). 
4 CAL. ConE CIV. P. § 338(1) places a three-year limit on actions "upon a liability 
created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture." 
5 Plaintiffs suggested Mutual Security Act of 1955, 69 Stat. 283, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) 
(1958), which provides a four-year limitation period in cases arising under the Clayton 
Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). 
6 E.g., Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 46 Stat. 534 (1930), 7 U.S.C. § 499e 
(1958); Trademark Act, 33 Stat. 728 (1905), 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1958); Civil Rights Act, REv. 
STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 2015: 
46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1958); Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1072 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1958). 
See Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 68 (1953). 
7 Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895). See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1f 3.07(2) 
(2d ed. 1961). 
s Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947). 
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Rules of Decision Act9 to apply the appropriate state statute of limitations. 
Only in suits which are exclusively equitable has the Court refused to 
consider the state limitation provisions controlling; in such suits the federal 
doctrine of Iaches applies instead.10 Although many treatise writers have 
expressed dissatisfaction with these judicial decisions,11 the courts, in 
general, have consistently adhered to their position.12 Congress has shown 
no willingness to make any sweeping changes either, despite some individual 
requests for action.13 
The California district court, in the principal case, dealing with an 
action traditionally considered legal in nature,14 declined to follow the 
well-entrenched rule. It attempted to justify its position by reference to 
several Supreme Court opinions15 which express the view that variegated 
state laws must necessarily yield to a general federal statute if the appli-
cation of such state laws would destroy the intended uniformity of federal 
labor legislation. This argument would appear to beg the question. The 
crucial question is whether the particular uniformity desired by Congress 
would be disrupted by the application of the appropriate state limitations 
to otherwise unlimited federal rights of action. At best, the court assembles 
sparse legal justification for its conclusion. Of the three cases cited as 
authority, two are clearly distinguishable16 on their facts and the third 
apparently is misread by the court.17 Moreover, the realities of the legisla-
tive process appear to work against the court. In an area as basic and 
as well-settled as this, it seems reasonable to infer that Congress is aware 
9 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1958). 
10 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 289 
(1940). 
11 See, e.g., Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 
13 I.AW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 216 (1948). 
12 E.g., Cassell v. Taylor, 243 F.2d 259, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See generally Develop-
ments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177 (1950). 
13 91 CONG. REc. 2926 (1945) (remarks of Representative Gwynne); 2 Hearings on 
H.R. 2788 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 
1st Sess. 155, 185 (1945) (remarks by Representative Springer and Solicitor Maggs of the 
Department of Labor). 
14 Section 303(b) gives only the right to recover damages which, historically, would 
entitle the plaintiff to an action at law. 
15 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Textile Workers 
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Gamer v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953). 
16 McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958), involved two claims, 
both aspects of a single cause of action, and the court applied the federal statute of 
limitations which was an integral part of one of these claims. Clearfield Trust Co. v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), involved the rights and duties of the federal govern-
ment on commercial paper it issued and the court concluded this constitutional function 
should not be dependent upon state law. 
17 Davis v. Rockton &: R.R.R., 65 F. Supp. 67 (W.D.S.C. 1946), stands for the proposi-
tion that a state statute of limitations cannot specifically discriminate against a federally-
created right. The case, however, affirms the use of those state limitations provisions which 
apply to state and federal causes of action alike. The California statute in the principal 
case is clearly of the latter type. 
1166 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 60 
of the existing law as formulated by the courts. A congressional act which 
does not specifically, or by clear implication, repudiate that judicial inter-
pretation could well be deemed to accept it, particularly when Congress 
has at times affirmatively "corrected" the judicial interpretation of its 
silence.18 
The very weakness of the argument accepted by the court in the prin-
cipal case19 may indicate that dissatisfaction with the state of the law in 
this area has reached such proportions that some courts are willing to 
grasp at straws to avoid the result which precedent seems to require. It 
is indeed arguable that the application of a wide variety of state statutes 
of limitations20 to federally-created rights produces an apparent anomaly. 
Further, the use of state limitations may raise practical problems, such as 
forum-shopping, which hamper the efficient administration of justice.21 
Despite these considerations, however, it seems certain that this attempt, 
and any future attempts by lower federal courts to avoid the established 
rules, will prove as abortive as have the few past attempts.22 Nevertheless, 
the underlying dissatisfaction is likely to continue to force its way to the 
surface until Congress ultimately finds it necessary to face the problem 
squarely.23 
There are several possible legislative solutions. First, Congress might 
amend each of the numerous federally-created rights24 to provide it with 
a specific limitation provision. This approach would completely eliminate 
the apparent anomaly of conditioning a federal right upon a state limita-
1s E.g., Mutual Security Act of 1955, 69 Stat. 283, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1958); Portal-to-
Portal Act, 61 Stat. 87 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1958). It is interesting to note that the 
latter statutory amendment, the Portal-to-Portal Act, was passed during the same session 
of Congress as the Labor-Management Relations Act. 
19 The court ends up utilizing a combination of the equitable doctrine of !aches and 
no period of limitations at all. See principal case at 915. Even assuming that }aches can 
properly be used in a traditionally legal action, this conclusion produces at least as great 
a lack of uniformity and uncertainty as the application of state limitations. 
20 See, e.g., 91 CONG. REc. 2926 (1945); 2 Hearings on R.R. 2788, supra note 13, at 185. 
The state provisions which limit a given type of suit may range from as little as six. 
months to periods in excess of ten years. 
21 See generally Hearings on S. 1910 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949) (statement of Thurman Arnold); Note, 
Disparities in Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 49 YALE L.J. 738 (1940). 
22 See Cassell v. Taylor, 243 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (plaintiff attempting to argue 
cause of action exclusively equitable); Kendall v. Keith Furnace Co., 162 F.2d 1002 
(8th Cir. 1947) (plaintiff attempting to argue application of state statute of limitations 
would destroy intended federal uniformity); Tobacco &: Allied Stocks v. Transamerica 
Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323 (D. Del. 1956) (terms of federal right rather than language of 
complaint determine whether remedy is solely equitable). 
23 The prevailing pattern is one of piecemeal legislation. When sufficient pressure 
builds up in a certain area Congress has usually amended the statutory right of action 
by a specific limitations provision. For examples of such legislation see statutes cited note 
18 supra. 
24 Statutes cited note 6 supra. 
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tion. It would also eliminate the administrative problems involved in 
the determination of the appropriate state statute. On the other hand, 
the extremely heavy legislative burden imposed upon Congress might out-
weigh the advantages to be gained.25 I£ Congress is unwilling or unable 
to shoulder a burden of this magnitude, it might instead pass a general 
federal statute of limitations which would provide a uniform period for all 
otherwise unlimited federal rights.26 However, Congress has previously 
considered and rejected a similar proposal,27 apparently because it was 
considered impracticable and inconsistent to subject the widely varied 
federal rights of action to a single period of limitations.28 But the bulk of 
the dissatisfaction with a general statute stemmed specifically from attempts 
to include within the same limitations period actions under both the Fair 
Labor Standards Act and the antitrust statutes.29 Since these areas now 
have their own limitations provisions30 it is conceivable that Congress 
might look with more favor upon a general federal statute. Additionally, it 
must be noted that in cases where the application of the uniform period 
might fail to produce a practically desirable result, Congress could remove 
the particular statutory right of action from the operation of the general 
statute by providing a specific limitations period for it. 
Paul Tractenberg 
2u Some indication of the weight of the legislative burden may be gathered from the 
fact that the record of the committee hearings on the Portal-to-Portal Act, 61 Stat. 87 
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1958), was over 1,200 pages long and included the statements of 
almost 100 interested parties. Hearings on S. 70 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); 2 Hearings on H.R. 584 Before a 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). 
26 There is no serious question concerning Congress' power to enact a general statute 
of limitations. In fact, it was argued in a number of cases that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1958), 
which provides a five-year limitation for "an action ••• for the enforcement of any civil 
fine, penalty or forfeiture" was such a statute. The provision was read narrowly, however, 
and it was held to refer only "to something imposed in a punitive way for an infraction 
of a public law." Chattanooga Foundry &: Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906). 
27 See generally 2 Hearings on H.R. 2788, supra note 13. 
28 See id. at 121; Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 
1177, 1267 (1950). A possible way to avoid some of the harshness of a single period for all 
federal rights was suggested by Alexander Holtzoff, then Special Assistant to the Attorney 
General. He recommended the adoption of a general statute which provided a six-year 
limit for actions sounding in contract and three for those in tort. 2 Hearings on H.R. 
2788, supra note 13, at 183. 
29 The management elements pressed for a very short period for FLSA actions since 
the decisions of the Wage-Hour Administrator operated retroactively and an employer 
could be liable to his employees for back.pay for a period as long as the applicable period 
of limitations. See Hearings on S. 70, supra note 25. On the other hand, it is generally 
recognized that antitrust suits require a lengthy period for preparation. 
30 Statutes cited note 18 supra. 
